PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS

SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.

ADVANCeMeNTS.

Where a will bequeathed all the residuary estate of the
testatrix in equal shares to her children, but provided that
Release of
Indebtedness

amounts of money formerly loaned to two of them
should be deducted, as advancements, from their

distributive portions, the Supreme Court of California held
inadmissible an instrument executed prior to the making of
the will, releasing them from all liability to the testatrix for the
loans in question: In re Tompkins, 64 Pac. 268. The ground
of the decision is that notwithstanding the releases, the will
shows a subsequent intention as to the method of finally distributing her property, and her right to prescribe this method
is not in this case affected by her prior acts.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The rule that successive occupants holding from one another
are allowed to tack their interests in making out the full period
sucz.eSSIv
of adverse possession, seems to be the rule generoccupats ally prevailing. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts applies it in the case of Wislartv. McKnight,
59 N. E. 1028, where the successive owners of a certain lot
occupied an adjoining strip, and at each conveyance of the lot
the grantor transferred the possession of the strip, though the
strip was not described in any of the deeds. Possession and
the right arising out of it, the court holds, may be transferred
in pai.
ATTORNY AND CTIENT.

There have undoubtedly been great relaxations in regard to
the old common-law rules as to champerty, maintenance, etc.
Champerty Sometimes the old rules are disregarded as no
longer applicable, resting upon a fear of an encouragement of litigation no longer regarded as serious. But
sometimes distinctions are drawn to get away from the strict
rule and that is the case in Hadlock v. Brooks, 59 N. E. Ioo9,
where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds that
the employment of an attorney under an agreement that he
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shall receive a part of the recovery does not constitute chainperty, unless it also contains the further element that the
attorney's services shall not constitute a debt due from the
client either before or after the recovery, but that the attorney
must look solely to the recovery for his compensation.
BANKRUPTCY.

It appeared in Fite v. Fie,6I S. W. 26, that upon a divorce
between husband and wife the husband was decreed to pay to
his wife a certain sum monthly as alimony. Later
Alimony
he was adjudged a bankrupt by the United States
District Court. It is held in the above case by the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky that his discharge in bankruptcy was a
bar to the enforcement of the judgment. The court comes to
the decision, apparently, with reluctance, but proceeds on the
principle that the discharge in the bankruptcy court is binding
on the state court, so long as the judgment of that court
stands; and by it he had been relieved from this liability to pay
alimony on the ground that he was just an ordinary debtor to.
his divorced wife, and the obligation was similar to one arising
out of contract.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Where an accommodation note is given as collateral security, the makers thereof are liable as principals and not as
Accommoda- sureties, and the extension of time on the principal
atinrlakers indebtedness without their consent will not release
them from liability: Dalaware County Trust, Safe-Deposit &
Title Ins. Co. v. Haser,48 At1. 694 (Pa.). In like manner, the
court holds that payment of an accommodation note taken as
collateral security may be enforced without resorting to theoriginal debt for payment.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY.

Whether evidence of seduction can be received in an action
for breach of promise of marriage, to enhance the damages,
Evidence of when such seduction has not been specially pleaded
Seduction was the question sought to be raised in Myiill v.
Bogardus, 59 N. E. 9oo. The Court of Appeals of New York,
intimating that the question is one of considerable difficulty,
decides the case on another ground; but Chief Justice Parker,
with whom concurred another member of the court, regarded
the question as properly presented and held that the evidencewould be inadmissible unless specially pleaded. These judges:
accordingly dissented from the decision of the majority.
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People vs. Coler, 59 N. E. 776, is an important decision. In
this case the section in question provided that there should
Public
Contracts

not be used on any municipal work within the
state any stone which it should be necessary

natri-,
to dress or carve for such use, unless the same
should be prepared for such use within the boundaries of the
State of New York. This requirement is held void; first,
as depriving municipalities and those contracting therewith of
the right to contract freely; and, second, as in contravention
of the Federal Constitution, vesting in Congress the right to
regulate interstate commerce.

The determination of the narrow line which divides the
cases where prohibition of the sale of articles of commerce is
constitutional, and where it is not, is constantly
Sale of
Prohibited

Articles

raising questions of difficulty. In State v. Layton,
61 S. W. 171, the Supreme Court of Missouri is

met by the question of the constitutionality of an act prohibiting the sale of alum baking powders. The act is upheld,
though with some seeming hesitation. The court regards it
as a bona fide attempt to guard the public health, and thinks
that the articles are not so universally conceded to be Wholesome and innocuous that judicial notice may be taken thereof.
A state has no power to regulate the charges of a railroad
company for the carriage of goods between two points in the
state, where the course of transportation must be
Interstate
Commerce,
Regulation

for a considerable part of the distance through

another state or territory: Kansas City Ry. Co. v.
Boardof RailroadCommissioners of Arkansas, io6
Fed. 353. Such transportation the United States Circuit
Court (W. D. Arkansas) holds, although continuous and made
on through bills of lading, constitutes commerce "among "
the states, within the meaning of the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution, and is subject to regulation by Congress
alone.
of Rates

In Plzelps-Bigelow Windmill Co. v. North American Trust
Co., 64 Pac. 63, a judgment had been perfected by a creditor.
Right in

At the time the law of Kansas upon an order of

sale provided for an appraisement of the property,
Remedies and that land should not be sold for less than twothirds of its appraised value. This law was subsequently
repealed and then an order of sale having been issued, the
property was sold without appraisement, and for a price much
less than two-thirds of an appraisement formerly made upon
Existing
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an unsuccessful attempt to sell under the old law. Under
these circumstances the Supreme Court of Kansas holds,
against the dissent of two judges, that the debtor, on whose
land the lien had rested, had no vested right in the remedies
or collection laws in force when the contract, upon which the
judgment arose, was made, which would prevent legislative
interference with them: that therefore the repeal of the
appraisement law and the sale of the property without
appraisement was valid.
CONTRACTS.

Just how far a declaration by one party of an intention not
to perform his part of the contract gives to the other party an
Accrual of immediate right of action, seems to be one of those
cause of.
branches of the law not yet thoroughly worked
Action
out. In Pittmanv.Pittman,61 S. W. 461, we have
one phase of this question presented. In that case the plaintiff had performed services for the defendant in consideration
of the defendant's promise to adopt him and make him the
defendant's heir. The defendant later declared that he did not
intend to carry out the contract, and it appeared that he had
acted fraudulently in making the promise. The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky holds that no recovery for the value of
the services rendered can be had during the life of the
defendant, for he may yet conclude to keep his contract.
Where it appeared that defendant had given plaintiff an
option on certain stock, agreeing to transfer it at any time
Option on before the option expired on payment of the price,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds (Guilstock,
Tender
ford v. Mason, 48 Atl. 386) that the strict rule of
tender does not apply to such a contract. The plaintiff had
no right to the actual transfer before he should pay his money,
and the defendant no right to the money before he should
deliver the stock. "The two things were interdependent, and,
in the eye of the law, were to be performed simultaneously."
Hence a new trial was granted, since plaintiff had been nonsuited on the ground that he was not prepared at any time to
make a strictly legal tender.
CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma holds, in ChicagoBuilding
& Mfg. Co. v. Lyon, 64 Pac. 6, that one cannot withdraw his
Subscription subscription to the capital stock of a corporation
to Capital
without the consent of all persons who subscribed
to such stock, prior to such withdrawal. The
Stock
principle from which the court draws its conclusion is that it
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regards the subscription by a number of persons to the stock
of a corporation to be thereafter formed by them, as constituting a contract between the subscribers to become stockholders
when the corporation is formed; hence that it is irrevocable
from the date of the subscription except upon the conditions
above.
A trustee having authority to erect a school-house, but no
power to borrow money, did borrow some to pay the conLiability of tractor by representing to the lender that the townTownship for ship had not the necessary funds. The money was

Money

Borrowed

paid to the contractor and the lender sued the
township.

The Appellate Court of Indiana holds,

in White River School Townslhi v. Dowel, 59 N. E. 867, that
the plaintiff might recover the money so loaned from the
township, though the trustee had no power to borrow. The
court claims it is a case for subrogation; that one party not
a mere volunteer pays for another the debt for which the latter
was primarily liable.

A case presenting somewhat similar facts to the case of
Bates v. Day, supra, but in which the court comes to a very
Acionf or different conclusion, is the case of Harrell v.
Unpaid
Blount, 38 S, E. 56. There the Supreme Court of
Subscription Georgia holds that a creditor of an insolvent cor-

poration, suing exclusively for his own benefit, may proceed
against stockholders for balance due uponitheir stock subscriptions without joining with them other stockholders, similarly
liable. The principle upon which the court proceeds is that
"the proceeding amounted to merely an equitable garnishment designed and subject to the plaintiff's demands against
the corporation assets belonging to it, which were beyond the
reach of legal process."
COVENANTS.

The difficulty of the common law in allowing a broken
covenant to run with land, is disregarded in Geiszler v. De
Against

Graaf,59 N. E. 993, where the Court of Appeals

incumbrances of New York holds that a covenant in a deed

against incumbrances is not a personal covenant, but runs

with the land, and passes to a remote grantee, though there
may have been a nominal breach of the covenant when the

deed was delivered. The necessity to work out practical
justice does not stop to satisfy the technicalities of the commonlaw rule.
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In Powers v. Commonwealth, 61 S. W. 735, one of the cases
arising out of the murder of Goebel, the Court of Appeals of
Pardoning
Kentucky by a majority decision holds that the
Power
pardons issued by Taylor after Goebel had been
declared governor by the legislature were invalid. The court
holds that when two persons are present at the seat of government, each claiming to be a governor de Jure, and each
assuming to perform the duties of the office, the one who is
governor de Jure is also governor de facto, especially as
affecting the validity of a pardon; that being an act of the
commonwealth's grace asserted against the commonwealth.
DESCENT.

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds, in Smith v. Becker,
164 Pac. 70, that the statute of their state (a statute similar to
imprisonment those of other states), providing that when a perfor Ufa
son shall be imprisoned under a sentence of
imprisonment for life, his estate, property and effects shall be
administered and disposed of in all respects as if he were
naturally dead, must be confined in its application to such disposition of the estate as is necessary to satisfy the rights of
creditors; the descent of the property is not cast upon the
heirs by the fact of such sentence and imprisonment. The
court regards important the considerations of possible commutation of the sentence or pardon. Three judges dissent, regarding the decision as defeating the very purpose of the statute.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES.

"The rule that a choice of one of two inconsistent remedies
or causes of action waives the other, applies only where there
stake as to are two such remedies or causes of action." The
Existence of Supreme Court of Wisconsin, applying this rule,
Additional
holds, in Fuller-Warren Co. v. Harter, 85 N. W.
Remedy
698, that if a person pursues a cause of action
which he erroneously supposes he has and is defeated because
of the error, he is not thereby precluded from suing over upon
the proper cause of action.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

In Kansas & T. Coal Ry. Co. v. Northwestern Coal & Mzkining Co., 61 S. W. 684, the Supreme Court of Missouri holds
Road, Private that where a railroad company is regularly organor Public? ized as such under laws making it a common carrier, the fact that its officers, directors, and stockholders are
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the same as those of a coal-mining company, from which the
railroad company will probably draw the major portion of its
business, and that the mining company has loaned the railroad
company the most of the capital required to build the road,
does not render it a private road, so as to deprive it of the
power of eminent domain. The property taken was from
another coal company, and three judges dissent from the
decision of the court on the ground that this is merely a
rivalry between two coal companies, in which one has assumed
the "garb of a railroad corporation," for the purpose of shutting out its rival from the market and reducing it to a dependency; that the land is therefore taken for a private purpose.
]VIDrNCE.

The general prevalence of statutes at the present day rendering incompetent one party to a contract, as to statements
competency or transactions in the presence of the deceased
of Witness party, gives more than local interest to the case of
Dickerson v. Payne, 48 Atl. 528. These statutes have most

frequently been applied where each party takes some part in
the transaction, or where evidence is offered as to statements
made, but in this case the Supreme Court of New Jersey holds
that in an action brought against an administrator to recover
for services rendered to the intestate by the plaintiff as house-

keeper and nurse, the plaintiff is not competent to testify to
services rendered in the presence of the intestate. The decision,
however it may be within the letter of the act, seems hardly
within its spirit.

In Hogan v. Carr, 48 At. 688, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds that a rough freehand drawing might be
Use of a
used by a handwriting expert to explain his
Diagram
methods to the jury, though it itself was not
admissible in evidence. But they further held that while it
was allowable for the expert so to use it, it was error for the
trial court to refuse to permit the counsel for the opposing side
to use it in making his address to the jury, since they regarded
the ruling as preventing the counsel from adequately and
intelligently discussing the methods of the expert.
EXTRADITION.

The Supreme Court, Special Term (New York County),
holds, in People ex rel. Gallagherv. Hogan, 69 N. Y. Supp.
Discretion of 475, that it is no defence to a warrant of extradiGovernor
tion that the prisoner has been convicted of a crime
in the state, but has been bailed during his appeal, and that he
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cannot be extradited till he has served his sentence, or until he
has been finally acquitted. The basis of the decision is that
the governor of the state may waive the right of the state to,
punish the prisoner for a crime committed in the state.
FELONY.
It has frequently been questioned whether the rule of the
common law that one guilty of a felony must have been convicted or acquitted, or that there have been some
Action for
Civil Damages other termination of the criminal proceeding, for
which the person upon whom the felony was committed was
not responsible, is still in force in our various jurisdictions.
The question arose in McBlain v. Edgar,48 At. 6oo, where
there was an action for damages for an offence (which at
criminal law would be rape) against a defendant who pleaded
that he remained at the time of the action wholly untried.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey overrules
the plea, holding that the reason upon which the common-law
rule was founded has disappeared under our modern system
of criminal procedure, with its public prosecutor. The court
says: "The duty of a private person in this state ceases when
he has made his complaint and appeared before the grand
jury and secured or failed to secure an indictment. After
that the prosecution is in the hands of the public prosecutor,
and for his acts the private citizen is not responsible, nor
chargeable with either his zeal or neglect in prosecuting."
FORMER RECOVERY.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds, in Kehoe v.

Philadelphia,48 AU. 679, that an action by a property owner

Change In against the city for damages caused by water
accumulating in holes in the street and percolating
Grade of
into the plaintiff's cellar after the grade of the
Street
street had been changed, was not barred by the recovery
which the plaintiff had had for the damages occasioned by the
change of grade. The court proceeds on the theory that the
new cause of action is for the negligent maintenance of the
street as altered by the change in grade.
GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA.
The Civil Code of California, following in this respect the
common law, allows gifts made in view of death to be revoked
by the giver at any time before death. In Adams
Sut to
Revoke, Death v. Atherton, 64 Pac. 283, it appeared that a person
of Donor
had made a gift mortis causa to the defendant, but
before her death had brought an action to revoke the gift, but
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she died before the trial. The Supreme Court of California
holds that the commencement and prosecution of the action
was sufficient to revoke the gift, though it did not proceed to
judgment on account of the death of the donor. Judgment is
therefore allowed to the executrix of the deceased donor.
HOMICIDE.

Evidence as to the flight of the accused, where the homicide is admitted, may be considered by the jury to determine
Degree of the degree of the crime charged. State v. Lyons,
Crime, Flight 64 Pac. 236 (Supreme Court of Idaho).
INFANTS.

The line between an infant's liability on the ground of fraud
and his ordinary non-liability in contract is sometimes diffiA close case appears in
Disafiirmance cult of application.
Damron v. Commonwealth., 61 S. W. 459. There
of Deed,
an infant had conveyed land to father to enable
Estoppel
the father to become surety in a bail bond, and that
fact was recited in the deed as the consideration therefor.
The court accepted the grantee as surety upon the faith of the
grantor's (the infant's) testimony in open court that he was
twenty-one years of age. Under these circumstances the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that the infant grantor
was estopped, upon arriving at age, to disaffirm the deed. We
are aware, say the court, that in some jurisdictions the contrary view is taken, but we believe that in most jurisdictions
the rule is as announced.
INSURANCE.

A condition of a fire policy, requiring the insured to furnish
proofs of loss within a certain time, is broken when the
Proofs of Loss,

insurer does not receive them until after such time,

though the insured mailed them before the time
had expired: Peabody v. Satterlee, 59 N. E. 818. The Court
of Appeals of New York, in reaching this conclusion, proceeds
upon the ground that where notice is required to be given
personal notice is intended, and the insured, by selecting the
mail, made it his agent and is liable for its effectiveness. Three
judges dissent without assigning any reason.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Third Circuit)
holds, in Life Insurance Co. v. O'Neill, io6 Fed. 8oo, that the
mere relation of father and son is not enough to
Insurable
Interest give an adult son an insurable interest in his
father's life. The court defines an insurable interest as follows:
Mailing
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" No person has an insurable interest in the life of another
unless he would in reasonable probability suffer a pecuniary
loss, or fail to make a pecuniary gain by the other's death; or
(in some jurisdictions) unless, in the discharge of some undertaking, he has spent money, or is about to spend money, for
the other's support or advantage."
JOINDEI.

OF ACTIONS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds, in Dutton v.
Borough of Lansdowne, 48 Atl. 494, that one injured by a
Defective
defective sidewalk cannot sue the municipality and
Sidewalk
the property owner in the same action on the
ground that they are not joint tort feasors, though both may
be liable: the owner's liability is primary; and that of the
municipality secondary. In case of such misjoinder of actions,
the court holds, no recovery may be had against either.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

The law seems well settled that ordinarily, if a tenant holds
over, the landlord may treat him as a trespasser or as tenant
Involuntary for another year, and collect rent accordingly. But
Holding Over how if the holding over be involuntary?
This
question arose in Sullivan v. George Ringler & Co., 69 N. Y.
Supp. 38, under the following circumstances: A. leased to B.;
B. sublet to C.; C. against the will of B. held over after the
expiration of his own and B.'s term: held that B. was liable
for another year's rent at the election of A. The Supreme
Court, Appellate Division (Second Department), holds that a
tenant will be excused for holding over, only if his removal at
the expiration of his lease is rendered impossible by inevitable
accident or the act of God, without fault of the party sought
to be charged.
Where a landlord and tenant having a lease for one year,
but three months of which had run, agreed that the tenant
might occupy the building at a fixed sum per
Changeof
Contract,
month so long as he remained therein, the Supreme
Consideration Court of Michigan held such agreement valid and
binding on the parties, though the rent agreed on was less
than the rent fixed on in the lease: Andre v. Graelner,85 N.
E. 464. The court proceeds on the theory that the contract
is in part executory, and that the tenant might refuse to perform his part and submit to damages, but that he is willing,
instead, to enter into this new contract, and that this presents
sufficient consideration.
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LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.

It is frequently difficult to draw the line between those
defences or rights which are personal to a debtor, and those
which his creditors may avail themselves of. Such
Creditors'
Suits
a question is presented in Callaway's Admnr. v.
Saunders, 38 S. E. 182, where the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia decides that a creditor may set up the statute of
limitations against another creditor of the debtor's estate,
though the debtor himself has not relied on that defence.
On the other hand a very similar question came up in
Bresee v. Bradfield, 38 S. E. 196, where there had been a conveyance by a cestui que trust to her father the trustee of the
cestu's interest in the trust estate. It purported to be in satisfaction of her indebtedness to him, and the same court holds
that whatever right the cestui may have to avoid the conveyance as made between those standing in a trust relation,
creditors have no such right on that ground, but if they wish
to have it set aside, they must do so on other grounds, e. g.,
that as to them it is fraudulent. In short, they gain nothing
from the fact that the conveyance was between those standing
in a fiduciary relation.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit)
holds, in Deweese v. Smith, io6 Fed. 438, that the statute of
Assessments limitations does not commence to run against the
enforcement of the entire liability or against the
upon
Stockholders enforcement of any particular portion of the
liability of the shareholder of a national bank to pay its debts,
until the time when the comptroller has declared the entire
liability or the particular portion of it in issue to be due.
PHYSICIANS.

The statutes requiring of physicians compliance with certain
legislative requirements before undertaking the practice of
medicine are quite general. In State v. Wilson,
Unlawful
64 Pac. 23, the Supreme Court of Kansas holds
Practice,
that in a criminal prosecution for violation of such
Burden of
laws, it devolves on the defendant to produce
Proof
evidence tending to show that he has satisfied the requirements of the statutes, e. g., in that state that he has attended
certain courses of instruction, and graduated in some medical
college, etc. The court bases its decision on the fact that such
evidence is not accessible to the state, and is peculiarly within
the defendant's knowledge and control. One judge dissents,
thinking this decision as to the onus probandimarks a radical
departure in criminal procedure.
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PUBLIC CHARITY.

In Troutman v. De Boissicre Odd Fellows' Orp0hans' Home,
64 Pac. 33, the Supreme Court of Kansas holds that an absolute conveyance of property to trustees "in trust
what
constitutes to provide a home upon said premises for -the
orphan children of deceased Odd Fellows of the State of
Kansas," creates a legal public trust or charity. Two judges
dissent, and the opinion of the court as well as the dissenting
opinion, carefully reviews the question of what constitutes a
public charity. The court cites the case of Philadelphiav.
Masonic Home, i6o Pa. 572, but regards it of doubtful application, inasmuch as there the question was with regard to exemption from taxation, while here the trust is attacked on the
ground that it violates the Rule against Perpetuities. The
dissenting judges hold that, in order to constitute a public
charity, so as to avoid the effect of this rule," the beneficiaries
must constitute a public or quasi public class, standing as a
class in relation to society, .and to whom as a class society is
under the obligations of charity.
RAILROADS.

A receiver of a railway company which furnishes cars to
another company, under a traffic arrangement whereby the
latter company is to operate them, is not liable for
Receiver's
damages resulting from such operation over the
Liability
tracks of the latter company: Thomson v. Dotterer, 29
Southern, 483 (Supreme Court of Louisiana).
WILLS.
The rule that where a portion of a residue is bequeathed to
one who dies before the testator, or to one incapable of taking,
the testator as to such portion dies intestate, is
Residuary
apparently well established. An exception to
Legatees,
this, or rather a case in which this rule is not
Incapable
of Taking
applied, appears in Martineau v. Simonson, 69 N.
Y. Supp. 185. In that case a testator bequeathed his residuary estate to his sons and daughter in equal shares, and two
of the sons were incapable of taking, under the New York
law, because they were subscribing witnesses to the execution
of the testator's will. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division
(Second Department), holds that the shares of such sons
passed to the other residuary legatees. The ground on which
the court proceeds is that the bequest was to a class, and the
court will regard the class as composed of those capable of
taking and those only.

